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Abstract
In a series of experiments, Bott and Noveck (2004) found that the computation of scalar infer-
ences, a variety of conversational implicature, caused a delay in response times. In order to deter-
mine what aspect of the inferential process that underlies scalar inferences caused this delay, we
extended their paradigm to three other kinds of inferences: free choice inferences, conditional per-
fection, and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts. In contrast to scalar inferences, the computation of these
three kinds of inferences facilitated response times. Following a suggestion made by Chemla and
Bott (2014), we propose that the time it takes to compute a conversational implicature depends on
the structural characteristics of the required alternatives.
Keywords: Pragmatics; Alternatives; Scalar inference; Conversational implicature; Sentence
processing; Conditional perfection; Free choice inferences; Clefts
1. Introduction
1.1. Conversational implicatures and utterance processing
In his Logic and conversation, Grice introduced conversational implicatures as proposi-
tions that can be calculated on the basis of the literal meaning of an utterance and the
assumption that the speaker is cooperative. To illustrate, suppose a student tells you, “I
did some of my homework.” The literal interpretation of this utterance is that she did at
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least some and possibly all of her homework. Nevertheless, you are likely to infer that
she did not do all of her homework. This scalar inference is often explained as a conver-
sational implicature along the following lines: The speaker could have been more infor-
mative and hence cooperative by using the alternative “I did all of my homework.” Why
didn’t she? Presumably because she did not do all of her homework (cf. Horn, 1972
2004).
Grice’s definition was intended as a criterion for demarcating different kinds of mean-
ing rather than a description of the cognitive processes that underlie the derivation of
conversational implicatures in actual conversations, as he emphasizes in the following
passage:
The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for
even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replacable by an
argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL impli-
cature [. . .]. (p. 50)
Despite his careful formulation, Grice is often credited with the view that listeners
actively calculate conversational implicatures (e.g., Levinson, 2000; Millikan, 2005;
Noveck & Sperber, 2007; Origgi & Sperber, 2000; R!ecanati, 1995; Sperber & Wilson,
1987; Wilson, 2000). One of the corollaries of this view is that listeners access the literal
interpretation of an utterance before calculating conversational implicatures. After all, the
literal interpretation is a premise in the reasoning process that leads to a conversational
implicature. This corollary is sometimes referred to as the literal-first hypothesis (e.g.,
Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015b).
A number of theorists have rejected the literal-first hypothesis attributed to Grice. For
example, R!ecanati (1995) argues that the literal interpretation and the interpretation
enriched with a conversational implicature are processed in parallel. Upon encountering a
potentially ambiguous constituent (e.g., “some”), both its literal (“at least some and possi-
bly all”) and its enriched (“at least some but not all”) meanings become activated and
enter into the interpretative process. The meaning that results in an interpretation that is
supported by the broader context is retained while the other meaning is suppressed.
According to this approach, it is possible for an utterance to immediately receive an
enriched interpretation without first establishing the literal interpretation, as long as it is
supported by the context (see, e.g., Chierchia, 2006; Chierchia, Fox, & Spector, 2012;
Geurts, 2010; Levinson, 2000; Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Sperber & Wilson, 1987, for
similar proposals).
Both sides of the debate have emphasized the importance of psycholinguistic evidence
to decide whether the literal-first hypothesis is correct. To this end, researchers have ana-
lyzed the processing times for various kinds of inferences that are commonly explained
as conversational implicatures, such as indirect questions (Clark, 1979; Gibbs, 1983), sar-
casm (Gibbs, 1986a), idioms (Gibbs, 1986b; Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos,
1978), metaphors (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, Gildea, & Bookin, 1982;
Harris, 1976), and hyperbole (Deamer, Pouscoulous, & Breheny, 2010). For all of these
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kinds of pragmatic inferences, it was found that the interpretation enriched with a conver-
sational implicature was processed at least as quickly as the literal interpretation, thus
casting doubt on the literal-first hypothesis.
There is, however, one class of information commonly explained as a conversational
implicature that seems to confirm the literal-first hypothesis, namely the aforementioned
scalar inferences. In their seminal paper, Bott and Noveck (2004) asked participants to
indicate the truth value of sentences like:
(1) a. Some dogs are mammals.
b. Some parrots are birds.
Such sentences are true if “some” receives its literal interpretation as “at least some
and possibly all,” but false if a scalar inference is computed and “some” is interpreted as
excluding “all.” In line with the literal-first hypothesis, it was found that “false” answers
took significantly longer than “true” answers.
The state of the art thus leaves us with the following conundrum: Why is the
derivation of scalar inferences, unlike many other types of conversational implicature,
associated with a processing cost? A solution to this problem is paramount in
determining whether the literal-first hypothesis is correct, or whether higher level
pragmatic reasoning permeates the process of semantic composition. This issue, in its
turn, is of twofold importance for understanding the role of conversational implicature
in linguistic communication.
1.2. Grice’s approach and Marr’s levels of analysis
What is the ontological status of Grice’s approach to pragmatics? As noted before, sev-
eral theorists have supposed that Grice’s approach implies a certain view on utterance
processing, according to which hearers actively calculate conversational implicatures. By
contrast, Geurts and Rubio-Fern!andez (2015) argue that Grice’s approach operates on an
altogether different level than that of utterance processing. In motivating their proposal,
Geurts and Rubio-Fern!andez appeal to Marr’s (1982) distinction between computational
and algorithmic levels of explanation.
The computational level of explanation describes what a system does and why,
whereas the algorithmic level focuses on how that system achieves its goal. Put differ-
ently, the computational level describes a system from the outside, whereas the algorith-
mic level describes its internal processes. To illustrate, consider an explanation of the
human heart. At the computational level, the human heart provides the body with oxygen
and nutrients (what) in order to sustain life (why). At the algorithmic level, it achieves its
goal by pumping blood around the body in a certain well-specified fashion (how).
Although the computational and the algorithmic levels constrain each other, there can
be a significant amount of slack between them. Geurts and Rubio-Fern!andez illustrate this
point using the example of syllogistic reasoning: Even though the set of valid types of
syllogism is well defined at the computational level, its implementation in most humans
is error prone and influenced by factors that are orthogonal to the notion of validity, for
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example, the content of the premises. Importantly, whether or not people judge a syllo-
gism as valid is intuitively immaterial to the question whether or not it is in fact valid.
According to Geurts and Rubio-Fern!andez, Grice’s approach operates at the computa-
tional level: It specifies the information hearers are entitled to infer (what) and how these
inferences are justified (why). Notwithstanding a certain current in the literature, it does
not say anything about the specifics of the inferential mechanism in our minds (how).
Hence, although the literal-first hypothesis and its parallel processing competitor are
mutually exclusive, both are compatible with Grice’s approach to pragmatics.
This conclusion does not trivialize the question of how conversational implicatures are
processed: Even though the computational and the algorithmic level do not designate
each other, the connection between them is bound to be systematic. Determining the
scope of Bott and Noveck’s (2004) findings and pinpointing the locus of the processing
cost associated with the derivation of scalar inferences will inform us about the nature of
this systematic connection.
1.3. The origin of conversational implicature
Why did conversational implicatures emerge in the first place? Is it not more prudent
and efficient to spell out exactly what we want to say rather than relying on the listener
to work it out based on the literal interpretation of an utterance and the assumption that
the speaker is cooperative? This question has received ample attention in the literature
(e.g., Hauser, 1996; Horn, 2004; Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Pinker, Nowak, & Lee, 2008;
Reboul, 2007).
According to Horn (2004), the evolution of communication is governed by a minimax
principle that encourages interlocutors to minimize their efforts and to maximize their pay-
offs. For both interlocutors, payoffs are maximized if the speaker achieves her commu-
nicative goal. The speaker’s effort may be equated to the length of the string she utters;
the hearer’s effort to the cognitive cost of the interpretative process (Horn, 1984; Martinet,
1962; Zipf, 1949). From the minimax perspective, then, conversational implicatures are
not expected to emerge as long as the extra cognitive cost incurred by the hearer is greater
than the effort saved by the speaker. Most authors have assumed that this is usually the
case and hence tried to explain the presence of conversational implicatures by appealing to
social constructs like face (Pinker et al., 2008) and manipulation (Reboul, 2007).
However, if it turns out that the extra cognitive cost for the hearer is restricted to sca-
lar inferences, the emergence of conversational implicatures may be expected even within
a communicative system that is governed by the minimax principle.
1.4. Outline
Why is the processing of scalar inferences so different from that of many other kinds
of conversational implicature? To answer this question, we extended Bott and Noveck’s
(2004) paradigm to four kinds of inferences that are often explained as conversational
implicatures: scalar inferences, free choice inferences, conditional perfection, and exhaus-
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tivity in “it”-clefts. We first discuss some of the previous work on the literal-first hypoth-
esis. Based on this discussion, we consider two possible explanations for Bott and
Noveck’s results, describe the four kinds of inferences in more detail, and spell out how
these inferences are predicted to behave. Afterward, we explain the details of our experi-
ment and present the results.
2. Previous work
2.1. Metaphors
The publication of Grice’s Logic and conversation was followed by a period of exten-
sive work on the literal-first hypothesis. As a representative example, we discuss the work
of Ortony et al. (1978) on metaphors. According to the “Gricean” view, the interpretation
of metaphors proceeds from the observation that the literal meaning is defective (Grice,
1975; Searle, 1979). In order to test this view, Ortony and colleagues measured reading
times for sentences such as:
(2) Regardless of the danger, the troops marched on.
In one condition, this sentence was preceded by a vignette about soldiers who found them-
selves in a dangerous situation. In the second condition, the preceding vignette was about chil-
dren whose behavior angered their babysitter. So the first condition steered participants
toward a literal interpretation of the target sentence; the second condition toward a metaphori-
cal interpretation. In addition, Ortony and colleagues varied the length of the vignette: In one
condition, it was just one sentence; in the other condition, it consisted of several sentences.
In the short vignette condition, all looked well for the literal-first hypothesis: Reading
times were significantly longer in the condition that steered participants toward a
metaphorical interpretation. However, when participants were provided with a more elab-
orate context, this difference disappeared and the metaphorical interpretation was
accessed just as quickly as the literal interpretation.
Although the experimental details differ, analogous results were found for indirect
questions (Clark, 1979; Gibbs, 1983), sarcasm (Gibbs, 1986a), metaphors (Gildea &
Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg et al., 1982; Harris, 1976), and hyperbole (Deamer et al.,
2010), all of which are often explained as conversational implicatures. Taken together,
these results seem to falsify the literal-first hypothesis. However, there is one study whose
results do support the literal-first hypothesis: Bott and Noveck (2004). We take a closer
look at this study in the next section.
2.2. Scalar inferences
Following work by Noveck (2001) and Noveck and Posada (2003), Bott and Noveck
(2004) investigated how long it takes for participants to determine the truth value of
sentences like (3). Such sentences are true if “some” receives its literal interpretation as
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“at least some and possibly all,” but they are false if a scalar inference is computed and
“some” is interpreted with an upper bound.
(3) a. Some dogs are mammals.
b. Some parrots are birds.
These scalar inferences are often explained as conversational implicatures (e.g., Gazdar,
1979; Horn, 1972 1984; Soames, 1982). According to such explanations, someone who
hears (3a) may reason as follows: The speaker could have been more informative by using
the alternative “All dogs are mammals.” Why didn’t she? Presumably because she does not
believe that this alternative is true. Assuming, furthermore, that the speaker knows whether
or not the alternative is true, it follows that the speaker takes the alternative to be false.
Participants in B&N’s experiment read sentences like (3) in a forced reading experi-
ment in which each word was flashed on the screen for 200 ms. They could provide their
answer immediately after the final word was flashed on the screen. B&N measured the
time between the onset of the final word and the moment one of the response buttons
was pressed. Many participants were ambivalent about the truth of sentences like (3),
varying their answer between structurally similar trials. Comparing the reaction times of
these ambivalent participants, B&N found that it took them significantly longer to answer
“false” than it took them to answer “true.” This difference in reaction times was absent
in a control condition in which the sentence was unambiguously true or false, as in (4).
In this condition, “false” answers did not take significantly longer than “true” answers:
(4) a. Some birds are parrots.
b. Some dogs are insects.
Taken together, these findings support the view that the enriched interpretation depends
on the prior calculation of the literal interpretation. B&N’s findings have since been repli-
cated in a number of studies (e.g., Chemla & Bott, 2014; Chevallier et al., 2008; De Neys
& Schaeken, 2007; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011; Huang & Snedeker, 2009a, 2011; Tomlin-
son, Bailey, & Bott, 2013, but see Feeney, Scrafton, Duckworth, & Handley, 2004; Grod-
ner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010, for apparently contradictory findings).
In sum, there is a marked difference in processing terms between scalar inferences, on
the one hand, and indirect questions, sarcasm, idioms, metaphors, and hyperbole, on the
other. What causes this difference? One potential explanation stems from the observation
that scalar inferences are a variety of quantity implicature.
Quantity implicatures are so-called because their computation proceeds from the obser-
vation that the speaker could have been more informative, which is usually determined
by comparing the informational value of an utterance with that of alternatives the speaker
could have uttered. For example, in order to decide that (3a) is underinformative, it has
to be compared with the alternative “All dogs are mammals.” By contrast, the calculation
of indirect questions, sarcasm, idioms, metaphors, and hyperbole starts with the recogni-
tion that the literal interpretation is either irrelevant (indirect questions) or nonsensical
(sarcasm, idioms, metaphors, and hyperbole). In neither case is it necessary to reason
about alternatives the speaker could have uttered.
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Therefore, one might conjecture that the processing cost associated with the compu-
tation of scalar inferences is caused by having to reason about the speaker’s beliefs
based on premises that involve counterfactual situations. A suggestive observation in
favor of this counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis, as we will call it, is that children
in general have problems with tasks that involve counterfactual reasoning (Bre-
heny, 2006; Proust, 2002; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998; Wimmer &
Perner, 1983). The counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis therefore predicts that children
should also be less prone to compute scalar inferences. This prediction has been con-
firmed in a number of studies (e.g., Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, & Meroni,
2001; Guasti et al., 2005; Huang & Snedeker, 2009b; Hurewitz, Papafragou, Gleitman,
& Gelman, 2006; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Pouscoulous, Noveck,
Politzer, & Bastide, 2007, but see Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011; Katsos & Bishop,
2010).
It follows from the counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis that all varieties of quantity
implicature should be associated with a processing cost, since the computation of these
inferences by definition involves reasoning about what the speaker could have said. This
prediction is challenged by findings reported in Chemla and Bott (2014), who extended
B&N’s paradigm to another kind of quantity implicature: free choice inferences. We dis-
cuss their study in the next section.
2.3. Free choice inferences
Free choice inferences are associated with utterances in which “or” is embedded under
an existential or universal quantifier (e.g., Jennings, 1994; Kamp, 1973):
(5) Beulah may have tea or coffee.
Someone who utters (5) is likely to convey that Beulah is allowed to choose between
having tea and having coffee. There has been some debate about the provenance of these
free choice inferences. Some authors locate their source in the semantics of modal
expressions (Barker, 2010; Merin, 1992) or the connective “or” (Geurts, 2005; Zimmer-
mann, 2000). Other authors explain free choice inferences as a variety of quantity impli-
cature (Fox, 2007; Franke, 2011; Geurts, 2010; Kratzer & Shimoyama, 2002; Schulz,
2005).
According to these implicature-based accounts, the derivation of free choice inferences
proceeds along the following lines. A speaker who says (5) could have been more infor-
mative by using one of the following alternatives:
(6) a. Beulah may have tea.
b. Beulah may have coffee.
Both of these alternatives are more informative than the literal meaning of (5), since a
disjunction is true whenever one of its disjuncts is true but not vice versa.
Why didn’t the speaker say, for example, (6a)? If she had used this alternative, she
would have communicated not just that Beulah is allowed to have tea, but also that she is
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not allowed to have coffee. The reason the speaker avoided this alternative, then, is that
she believes it is not the case that Beulah is allowed to have tea but not coffee. The same
reasoning goes, mutatis mutandis, for (6b), which implies that the speaker believes that it
is not the case that Beulah is allowed to have coffee but not tea. Together with the literal
meaning of (5), this entails that Beulah is allowed to have tea and that she is allowed to
have coffee.
There is an important difference between the computation of free choice inferences
and scalar inferences. In the case of scalar inferences, it suffices for the hearer to reason
about the literal meaning of the alternatives, whereas in order to compute free choice
inferences, she also has to reason about what the speaker would have implied had she
uttered one of the alternatives. So, assuming that the counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis
is correct, that is, that reasoning about what the speaker could have said leads to a pro-
cessing cost, and free choice inferences are predicted to lead to a similar or possibly even
greater increase in reaction times.
Chemla and Bott (2014) provide substantive evidence against this prediction. For
example, in their first experiment, participants were familiarized with a vignette according
to which engineers were allowed to save artifacts and zoologists were allowed to save
living beings. Afterwards, participants were presented with sentences such as (7), which
are true on their literal interpretation, but false if free choice inferences are computed,
since zoologists are not allowed to save artifacts and engineers are not allowed to save
living beings:
(7) a. Beverly-the-zoologist is allowed to save a hammer or a lion.
b. Essie-the-engineer is allowed to save a kangaroo or a fork.
As in B&N’s experiment, many participants were ambivalent about the truth of sen-
tences like (7), varying their answer between structurally similar trials. C&B analyzed
the response times of these ambivalent participants, but they did not find a significant
difference between “true” and “false” answers. They also included a control condition
involving sentences that were unambiguously true or false, such as (8). Comparing these
two conditions, C&B found an interaction between condition (target or control) and
response (true or false). In the control condition, “false” answers were significantly
slower compared to “true” answers than in the target condition. So computing free
choice inferences reduced the increase in response times that was present in the control
condition.
(8) a. Federico-the-engineer is allowed to save a hammer or a fork.
b. Martina-the-engineer is allowed to save a lion or a kangaroo.
These findings appear to contradict the counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis, since the
derivation of free choice inferences mirrors that of scalar inferences in that it proceeds
from the observation that the speaker could have been more informative.
C&B tentatively suggest another explanation, which is intimately connected to the the-
ory of alternatives propagated by Katzir (2007) (cf. also Fox & Katzir, 2010, but see
Rooth, 1992, for a different approach). According to Katzir, alternatives are constructed
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from the uttered sentence by means of three elementary operations on its syntactic struc-
ture: deleting constituents, substituting constituents with elements from the lexicon, and
replacing constituents with contextually given material. To illustrate, consider the follow-
ing two pairs of sentences:
(9) a. Some dogs are mammals.
b. All dogs are mammals.
(10) a. Federico-the-engineer is allowed to save a hammer or a lion.
b. Federico-the-engineer is allowed to save a hammer.
Constructing (9b) as an alternative to (9a) requires substituting “some” with another
constituent from the lexicon: “all.” By contrast, the construction of (10b) from an utter-
ance of (10a) involves deleting one of the disjuncts from the uttered sentence. In this
respect, then, scalar inferences differ from free choice inferences.
Based on this observation, C&B suggest that the computation of a conversational
implicature is only time consuming if constructing the required alternatives involves sub-
stituting elements from the uttered sentence with words from the lexicon. Since the alter-
natives needed for the derivation of free choice inferences can be constructed by
removing constituents from the uttered sentence, the derivation of these inferences pro-
ceeds without a processing cost. In what follows, we refer to this explanation as the lexi-
cal-access hypothesis.
The lexical-access hypothesis receives support from a developmental study by Barner
et al. (2011). In line with much previous evidence, these authors found that children are
less likely to derive scalar inferences than adults. For example, almost all children indi-
cated that the statement “Some animals are sleeping” was a correct description of a situa-
tion in which all animals were sleeping. However, Barner and colleagues also observed
that almost all children considered the statement “Only some animals are sleeping” a cor-
rect description of the same situation. This finding suggests that children fail to see that
“All animals are sleeping” is an alternative to the statement with “some.” Assuming that
the reason why children compute fewer scalar inferences than adults is the same reason
why adults who compute scalar inferences take longer to respond, and it follows that
B&N’s results are caused by the need to construct alternatives by consulting the lexicon.
Alternatively, C&B’s results may be construed as evidence against the view that free
choice inferences are a variety of quantity implicature in the first place. Indeed, there are
a number of other observations that cast doubt on this assumption (cf. Chemla, 2009;
Geurts, 2010; Jennings, 1994; van Tiel, 2012; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain, 2015). Under
this assumption, the counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis can be salvaged in spite of
C&B’s results.
In order to arrive at a more decisive interpretation of the previous results, we extend
the scope of inquiry to two kinds of inferences that have hitherto received less attention
in the theoretical and experimental literature: conditional perfection and exhaustivity in
“it”-clefts. Both of these inferences are often viewed as varieties of quantity implicature,
that is, their derivation involves reasoning about what the speaker could have said. In nei-
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ther case, however, are alternatives constructed by substituting constituents in the uttered
sentence with elements from the lexicon, thus allowing a direct comparison of the
counterfactual-reasoning and lexical-access hypotheses. In the next section, we consider
these two inference types in some more detail.
3. Extending the scope
3.1. Conditional perfection
The notion of conditional perfection was popularized by Geis and Zwicky (1971) based
inter alia on the following sentence:
(11) If you mow the lawn, I will give you five dollars.
On its literal interpretation, someone who utters this sentence implies that mowing the
lawn is a sufficient condition for receiving five dollars. In other words, it is impossible
that the hearer mows the lawn, but fails to receive five dollars. According to Geis and
Zwicky, however, an utterance of this sentence normally implies, in addition, that mow-
ing the lawn is a necessary condition for receiving five dollars. That is, the speaker will
usually be taken to imply that it is impossible for the hearer to receive five dollars if she
does not mow the lawn.
Several authors have argued that Geis and Zwicky’s characterization is too strong
(e.g., von Fintel, 2001, unpublished data; Franke, 2009; Geurts, 2010; Lilje, 1972).
According to these authors, someone who utters (11) does not normally convey that
mowing the lawn is the only course of action that would lead her to giving the hearer five
dollars. For example, the speaker might also give five dollars if the hearer cleans up the
garage or does the dishes. Instead, these authors assume that an utterance of (11) implies
the weaker inference that the speaker will not give five dollars unconditionally. It is this
weak variety of conditional perfection that we will test in our experiment.
There has been much debate about the provenance of conditional perfection. In his
overview article, van der Auwera (1997) categorizes the various proposals that have
been made. Of the 50 articles he reviews, 35 argue that conditional perfection is due to
a quantity implicature. Eight articles go against this explanation, and the remaining
seven articles are indeterminate. Much of the literature since van der Auwera’s over-
view side with the implicature-based view (e.g., von Fintel, 2001; Franke, 2009; Geurts,
2010; Horn, 2000; Levinson, 2000). It therefore seems safe to claim that there is a
broad consensus about the status of conditional perfection as a kind of quantity impli-
cature.
How to compute the weak variety of conditional perfection as a quantity implicature?
Suppose someone utters (11). She could have been more informative by saying “I will
give you five dollars.” Why didn’t she? Presumably because she will not give the hearer
five dollars unconditionally. According to this procedure, deriving conditional perfection
involves reasoning about what the speaker could have said based on alternatives that are
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generated by deleting constituents in the speaker’s utterance. In both respects, conditional
perfection mirrors free choice inferences.
3.2. Exhaustivity in “it”-clefts
The following sentence illustrates exhaustivity in “it”-clefts:
(12) It was a pizza that Mary ate.
On its literal interpretation, someone who utters this sentence implies that Mary ate a
pizza. This interpretation is compatible with a situation in which Mary ate other things
besides a pizza. However, in most situations, someone who utters (12) will be taken to
imply that Mary did not eat anything other than a pizza. It is the latter inference that is
referred to as exhaustivity in “it”-clefts.
As for free choice inferences, there is no consensus about the provenance of exhaustiv-
ity in “it”-clefts. Although the implicature-based approach seems to be the most popular
(e.g., Byram-Washburn, 2012; DeClerck, 1988; Dufter, 2009; Hartmann & Veenstra,
2013; Horn, 1981; Pavey, 2004; Vallduv"ı, 1993), alternative proposals locate the source
of exhaustivity in the semantics of the cleft construction (Atlas & Levinson, 1981; Bolin-
ger, 1972; Hedberg, 2000; Kiss, 1998), a conventional implicature (Halvorsen, 1978), or
a presupposition (B€uring & Kri$z, 2013; Percus, 1997). However, much of the recent
experimental evidence speaks in favor of an implicature-based account (Destruel &
Farmer, 2015; DeVeaugh-Geiss, Zimmermann, Onea, & Boell, 2015; Drenhaus, Zimmer-
mann, & Vasishth, 2011; Heizmann, 2007; Onea & Beaver, 2011). As we will see later,
our own results present further evidence in this respect.
One way of deriving exhaustivity in “it”-clefts as a quantity implicature is by reason-
ing as follows: If the speaker believed that Mary ate something other than a pizza, she
would have mentioned it. Since she did not, it follows that she believes that Mary did not
eat anything other than a pizza. According to this proposal, the derivation of exhaustivity
in “it”-clefts involves reasoning about what the speaker could have said without recourse
to alternatives altogether (Geurts, 2010).
In order to decide between the counterfactual-reasoning and lexical-access hypotheses,
we compared the processing times of scalar inferences, free choice inferences, conditional
perfection, and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts in an integrated experimental design. In the next
section, we discuss the details of the experiment. Afterward, we outline the predictions of
the two hypotheses.
4. This study
4.1. The task
Instead of B&N’s and C&B’s sentence verification tasks, we employed a sentence–
picture verification task. This change in methodology has a practical motivation: For
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some of the inferences we investigated, it was difficult to find sentences that were
introspectively true on their literal interpretation, but false if the inference in question
was computed. The sentence–picture verification task avoids this difficulty. Moreover,
it has already been employed in several studies on scalar inferences (e.g.,
Barner et al., 2011; Geurts & Pouscoulous, 2009; Geurts & van Tiel, 2013; Guasti
et al., 2005; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Pouscoulous et al., 2007). Degen and
Tanenhaus (2011, 2015a) replicated B&N’s results using the sentence–picture verifica-
tion task.
Each trial in our experiment started with a sentence that was followed by a picture.
Participants had to indicate if the sentence was a good description of the picture that fol-
lowed it. All of the situations consisted of a number of colored geometrical shapes. Four
colors—red, green, blue, and yellow—and three kinds of geometrical shapes—squares,
circles, and triangles—were used. The target sentences were followed by three types of
situations: a target situation, in which the sentence was literally true, but false if the infer-
ence in question was derived, and two control situations, in which the sentence was
unambiguously true or false. These control situations were included to compensate for
possible response biases (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972). An overview of
the target sentences and the corresponding situations is provided in Fig. 1. We will now
discuss these conditions in more detail.
4.2. Scalar inferences
An example target sentence for scalar inferences is provided below, alongside its
important characteristics. The logical form shows the assumed underlying representa-
tion of the target sentence used in the experiment. The literal interpretation paraphrases
the truth conditions of the logical form. The alternative is constructed by substitution.
The target inference paraphrases the information obtained by reasoning about the con-
tent of the alternative. Together with the literal interpretation, this produces the
enriched interpretation. For clarification, linguistic forms are marked with quotation
marks.
Target sentence: “Some of the shapes are red.”
Logical form: ∃x[SHAPEðxÞ ^ RED(x)]
Literal interpretation: There is at least one red shape.
Alternative: “All of the shapes are red.”
Constructed by: Substitution
Target inference: Not all of the shapes are red.
The color term was varied between items. In the target situation, all of the shapes were
red. In this situation, the sentence was true on its literal interpretation, but false if the tar-
get inference was derived. In the first control situation, some but not all of the shapes
were red, in line with both the literal and the enriched interpretation of the target sen-
tence. In the second control situation, none of the shapes were red, thus contradicting
both possible interpretations.
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Fig. 1. Examples of target sentences for each of the four kinds of inferences. In the first picture, the sentence
is unambiguously true; in the second picture, unambiguously false; and in the third picture, the truth value
depends on whether the target inference is computed. S: Target sentence. A: Alternative. I: Target inference.
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4.3. Free choice inferences
The characteristics of free choice inferences are described below:
Target sentence: “Each of the shapes is red or green.”
Logical form: ∀x[SHAPE(x) ? [RED(x) ∨ GREEN(x)]]
Literal interpretation: No shape is neither red nor green.
Alternative: “Each of the shapes is red/green.”
Constructed by: Deletion
Target inference: Not all of the shapes are red/green.
The color terms were varied between items. Note that the target sentence for free
choice inferences differs from the one used by C&B. In our experimental sentence, “or”
occurred embedded under a universal quantifier over individuals rather than under an
existential quantifier over deontically accessible possible worlds. From a theoretical view-
point, however, the computation of the free choice inferences proceeds along similar
lines: The listener concludes from an utterance of the target sentence that the speaker
considers the alternatives “Each of the shapes is red” and “Each of the shapes is green”
to be false. Assuming that the speaker is truthful, it follows that there are both red and
green shapes. Unlike in C&B’s example, it suffices to reason about the literal meaning of
the alternatives to compute free choice inferences in this example (Fox, 2007; Geurts,
2010; Klinedinst, 2007, but see Crni$c, Chemla, & Fox, 2015, for an argument that these
cases also involve reasoning about the pragmatic meaning of the alternatives).
There are two motivations for our departure from C&B. First, it was difficult to
straightforwardly encode permission in pictures. Second, testing a different kind of target
sentence provides a means to gauge the robustness and generality of C&B’s findings for
free choice inferences on the whole. See Data S1 in the Supplementary Material for
results of an experiment that stays closer to C&B’s design.
In the target situation, either each of the shapes was red or each of the shapes was
green. In these situations, the target sentence was true on its literal interpretation, but
false if free choice inferences were computed to arrive at the conclusion that there were
both red and green circles. The first control situation showed a mixture of red and green
circles, thus verifying both the literal and the enriched interpretation. The second control
situation contained one shape that was neither red nor green, which falsified the target
sentence on both of its interpretations.
4.4. Conditional perfection
The characteristics of conditional perfection are outlined below:
Target sentence: “Each of the shapes is red if it is a circle.”
Logical form: ∀x[CIRCLE(x) ? RED(x)]
Literal interpretation: No circle is not red.
Alternative: “Each of the shapes is red.”
Constructed by: Deletion
Target inference: Not all of the shapes are red.
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The color and shape terms were varied between items. All situations contained three
circles and two squares. In the target situation, all of the shapes were colored red, so that
the sentence was true on its literal interpretation but false if the conditional was perfected.
In the first control situation, each of the circles was red while each of the squares was a
different color, in line with both the literal and the enriched interpretation. In the second
control situation, at least one of the circles was not red, thus falsifying the sentence.
4.5. Exhaustivity in “it”-clefts
The characteristics of exhaustivity in “it”-clefts, the fourth and final kind of inference
included in the experiment, are laid out below. Recall that the computation of exhaustiv-
ity in “it”-clefts proceeds without recourse to alternatives.
Target sentence: “It is the circle that is red.”
Logical form: ∃!x[CIRCLEðxÞ ^ RED(x)]
Literal interpretation: The circle is red.
Alternative: –
Constructed by: –
Target inference: Only the circle is red.
The color and shape terms were varied between items. All situations contained one cir-
cle and one square. In the target situation, both shapes were red. In this situation, the
exhaustivity inference was false. In the first control condition, the circle was red and the
square a different color. In the second control condition, the square was red and the circle
a different color. These situations unambiguously verify and falsify the sentence.
4.6. Predictions
In the previous sections, we have discussed two possible explanations for B&N’s find-
ing that the derivation of scalar inferences, unlike that of several other varieties of con-
versational implicature, is associated with a processing cost.
According to the counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis, the processing cost is due to the
difficulty of recognizing that the literal interpretation is underinformative, since doing so
involves reasoning about what the speaker could have said. In order to accommodate
C&B’s finding that the derivation of free choice inferences is not associated with a pro-
cessing cost, this explanation has to assume that these inferences are not a variety of
quantity implicature.
If this hypothesis is correct, we expect to find that conditional perfection and exhaus-
tivity in “it”-clefts, assuming that the latter is indeed due to a quantity implicature, pat-
tern with scalar inferences in leading to a delay in response times. Concretely, this delay
in response times entails the presence of an interaction between condition (control or tar-
get) and response (true or false) for these two types of inferences, such that “false”
responses take significantly longer than “true” responses in the target condition when
compared to the control condition.
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The lexical-access hypothesis supposes that whether or not the computation of a conver-
sational implicature is associated with a processing cost depends on the structural character-
istics of the required alternatives. Specifically, a processing cost is expected if the
alternatives are constructed by substituting constituents in the uttered sentence with words
from the lexicon. This explanation straightforwardly extends to C&B’s results: Free choice
inferences are not associated with a processing cost since the alternatives needed for their
derivation can be constructed by removing constituents from the uttered sentence.
If the lexical-access hypothesis is correct, the computation of conditional perfection
and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts should not lead to an increase in response times. Indeed,
both kinds of inferences should pattern with free choice inferences and differ significantly
from scalar inferences. Generalizing C&B’s results for free choice inferences, this
hypothesis predicts the presence of an interaction between condition (control or target)
and response (true or false) for these two types of inferences, such that “true” responses
take significantly longer than “false” responses in the target condition when compared to
the control condition.
In Fig. 2, the predictions made by the counterfactual-reasoning and lexical-access
hypotheses are displayed, assuming that we replicate B&N’s and C&B’s findings for sca-
lar inferences and free choice inferences. To explain, consider the case of conditional per-
fection according to the counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis. The line indicates that the
difference between the response times in target and control conditions is smaller for
“true” answers than for “false” answers. More specifically, in the case of “false” answers,
responses times in the target condition are significantly slower than in the control condi-
tion when compared to the difference between these conditions in the case of “true”
responses. In more intuitive terms, the line indicates that the counterfactual-reasoning
hypothesis predicts a processing cost for the derivation of conditional perfection.
In this discussion, we have passed over the question of whether the increase in
response times is present in the reading times, decision times, or both. We do not have
specific expectations either way, but it will be interesting to see at what point participants
engage in pragmatic reasoning.
Fig. 2. Interaction effects (target minus control) predicted by the counterfactual reasoning hypothesis (black)
and the lexical access hypothesis (gray).
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In the next section, we outline the details of the sentence–picture verification task con-
ducted to test these predictions. Afterward, we discuss the results.
5. The experiment
5.1. Participants
The experiment was hosted on the Ibex Farm. Forty-five participants were drafted on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mage ¼ 30; range = 19–59; 24 females).1 Only workers
with an IP address from the United States were eligible for participation. In addition,
these workers were asked to indicate their native language. Payment was not contingent
on their response to this question. All participants were native speakers of English. One
participant indicated that both English and Spanish were her native languages. We
included this participant in this analysis we discuss below.
5.2. Materials
The experiment consisted of 60 trials in total and included four types of sentences cor-
responding to the four types of inferences:
(13) a. Some of the shapes are C. Scalar inference
b. Each of the shapes is C1 or C2. Free choice inference
c. Each of the shapes is C if it is a S. Conditional perfection
d. It is the S that is C. Exhaustivity in “it”-clefts
C was varied between “red,” “green,” “blue,” and “yellow.” S was varied between
“square,” “circle,” and “triangle.” The pictures for the first three types of inferences
always consisted of five shapes. The pictures for exhaustivity in “it”-clefts always con-
sisted of two shapes.
For each inference type, three kinds of situations were constructed: two control situa-
tions and one target situation. In the first control situation, the sentence was unambigu-
ously true; in the second control situation, it was unambiguously false; in the target
situation, its truth value depended on whether a conversational implicature was derived.
See Fig. 1 for examples of these situations. Each kind of situation occurred five times for
each inference type. The order of the items was randomized for each participant.
5.3. Procedure
On each trial, the target sentence was displayed first. Participants were instructed to press
the space bar as soon as they had read and understood the sentence. Thereupon, the sentence
disappeared and was replaced by a picture. Participants had to decide as quickly as possible
whether the sentence was true or false as a description of the depicted situation, and had to
register their decision by pressing one of two keys. Thereupon, the picture disappeared and
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was replaced by the message “(Press the space bar to continue.).” Upon pressing the space
bar, the next trial commenced. The full instructions went as follows:
In this experiment you are going to read sentences. Each sentence is followed by a pic-
ture. It’s your task to decide if the sentence is a good description of the picture that fol-
lows it. Each picture shows a number of colored shapes. There are three possible shapes:
First the sentence will appear. Press the space bar once you have read it. After that the
sentence disappears and is replaced by the picture. Press ‘1’ if you consider the sentence
a good description of the picture; otherwise press ‘0’.
We are interested in your spontaneous responses, so don’t think too long before
answering.
Reading times were recorded from sentence onset to the point at which the space bar
was pressed. Decision times were recorded from situation onset to the point at which the
“1” or “0” key was pressed.2
5.4. Data treatment
Six participants were removed for making mistakes on more than 10% of the control
items. This cutoff criterion was chosen because there was a significant gap between the
participants that were removed (more than 9 errors) and the participants that were retained
(between 0 and 4 errors). The average rate of mistakes for the participants that were retained
was 3.5%. These mistakes were removed from analyses of reading and decision times but
are plotted in Fig. 3. In addition, trials with a reading or decision time faster than 200
milliseconds or slower than three times the standard deviation from the mean by participant
and condition were removed from the analysis, which resulted in the removal of 2.2% of the
data. We assume that these data points indicate that participants either accidentally pressed
one of the response keys or did not pay full attention to the task at hand. The reading and
decision times were logarithmized to reduce the positive skewness of their distribution.
5.5. Inferential analysis
The design contained three independent variables: inference type (scalar inference, free
choice inference, conditional perfection, or exhaustivity in “it”-clefts), condition (control
or target), and response (true or false).
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The results were analyzed by fitting linear or binomial mixed models predicting read-
ing times, decision times, and choice proportions. These models were constructed in R, a
programming language and environment for statistical computing (R Development Core
Team, 2006) using the lme4 package (Bates & Maechler, 2009). The corresponding
p-values were calculated by approximating denominator degrees of freedom using the
Satterthwaite procedure as implemented in the lmertest package (Kuznetsova, Bruun
Brockhoff, & Haubo Bojensen Christensen, 2013).
In all analyses, random slopes and intercepts were included for participants and items
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). In some analyses, the random effects structure
had to be simplified because the maximal model failed to converge. Multiple compar-
isons were carried out using the multcomp package (Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall,
2008). The analyses of reading times and decision times included trial number as a fixed
factor.
5.6. Choice proportions
The percentages of “true” responses in each condition are summarized in Fig. 3. For
scalar inferences (58% literal responses), conditional perfection (43%), and exhaustivity
in “it”-clefts (54%), literal responses were roughly as frequent as pragmatic responses.
Participants in the case of free choice inferences had a pronounced preference for prag-
matic responses: 70% of the responses were pragmatic. A binomial mixed model was
constructed to predict responses (true or false) based on inference type (scalar infer-
ence, free choice inference, conditional perfection, or exhaustivity in “it”-clefts). Post
hoc comparisons indicated that all four choice proportions differed significantly from
each other (p’s < .02) except for the choice proportions for scalar inferences and
exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (b = 0.33, SE = 0.28, Z = 1.18, p = .636). There was no
effect of trial number on responses to target items (b = 0.00, SE = 0.01, Z < 1). That
is, the number of pragmatic responses did not increase or decrease throughout the
experiment.
Fig. 3. Percentage of “true” responses for each inference type in control (C-True and C-False) and target
situations.
B. van Tiel, W. Schaeken / Cognitive Science (2016) 19
Some participants consistently gave literal or pragmatic responses. For scalar infer-
ences (18 consistently literal responders and 11 consistently pragmatic responders) and
exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (12/11), the consistently literal responders outnumbered the con-
sistently pragmatic responders. For conditional perfection (7/13) and free choice infer-
ences (6/22), the opposite pattern was observed. Fig. 4 shows that the proportions of
literal responses were distributed bimodally for each inference type, although the
bimodality was slightly more pronounced for scalar inferences and free choice inferences
than for exhaustivity in “it”-clefts and, in particular, conditional perfection. Overall, there
were seven participants who provided consistent answers across all inference types. Three
gave exclusively literal responses; four exclusively pragmatic responses.
One might wonder whether participants were consistent across different inference
types, that is, whether participants gave a comparable number of pragmatic responses for
each inference type. To test this, we calculated the product–moment correlation between
the number of pragmatic responses for each pair of inference types. The results of this
analysis are summarized in Fig. 5.
The correlation was significant across the board. The number of pragmatic responses
for scalar inferences correlated significantly with the number of pragmatic responses for
free choice inferences (r = .46, p = .003), conditional perfection (r = .46, p = .003), and
exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (r = .73, p < .001). The number of pragmatic responses for free
choice inferences correlated significantly with the number of pragmatic responses for con-
ditional perfection (r = .44, p = .005) and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (r = .44, p = .005).
Lastly, the number of pragmatic responses for conditional perfection correlated signifi-
cantly with the number of pragmatic responses for exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (r = .67,
p < .001).
Both the observation that participants are ambivalent about the truth value of the target
sentence and the finding that the number of pragmatic responses correlates significantly
with the number of pragmatic responses to scalar inferences and conditional perfection
are in line with the assumption that free choice inferences and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts
are varieties of quantity implicature.
Fig. 4. Distribution of the proportions of literal responses for each of the four inference types.
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5.7. Reading times
Trial number had a significant effect in all of the analyses (all p’s < .001): Reading
times became significantly shorter throughout the experiment. Reading times were signifi-
cantly different for each inference type (all p’s < .002). There was no main effect of con-
dition (control or target) or response (true or false) for any of the four types of inferences
(all p’s > .19). Importantly, the interaction between condition and response was also not
significant for any of the four types of inferences (all t’s < 1).
5.8. Decision times
The average decision times for each kind of inference are summarized in Fig. 6 and
Table 1. Trial number had a significant effect in all of the subsequent analyses (all
p’s < .001): Decision times became significantly shorter throughout the experiment. Deci-
sion times for conditional perfection were significantly slower than for the other three
inference types (all p’s < .02). There were no significant differences in decision times for
the other inference types (all p’s < .19).
The interaction between condition (control or target) and response (true or false) was
significant for each inference type: scalar inferences (b = $0.29, SE = 0.12, t = $2.50,
p = .027), free choice inferences (b = 0.27, SE = 0.07, t = 3.84, p < .001), conditional
Fig. 5. The number of pragmatic responses for each pair of inference types including regression lines with
product–moment correlation coefficients. Jitter added for purposes of illustration.
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perfection (b = 0.33, SE = 0.08, t = 4.17, p < .001), and exhaustivity in ‘it’-clefts
(b = 0.18, SE = 0.07, t = 2.43, p = .019).
Observe that the direction of the interaction was different for scalar inferences com-
pared to the other three types of inferences. In the case of scalar inferences, “false”
responses were slower than “true” responses in the target condition when compared to
the difference between these responses in the control condition. By contrast, in the cases
of the other three types of inferences, “false” responses were faster than “true” responses
in the target condition when compared to the difference between these responses in the
control condition. In other words, in the cases of free choice inferences, conditional per-
fection, and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts, computing the inference facilitated decision times.
In order to determine if the interaction between condition and response was signifi-
cantly different for different kinds of inferences, we analyzed the three-way interactions
between condition, response, and kind of inference for each pair of inferences. The three-
way interaction was significant for scalar inferences and each of the other three infer-
ences: free choice inferences (b = $0.56, SE = 0.12, t = $4.54, p < .001), conditional
perfection (b = $0.66, SE = 0.12, t = $5.52, p < .001), and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts
(b = $0.46, SE = 0.11, t = $4.08, p < .001). In addition, there was a significant three-
way interaction between conditional perfection and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (b = $0.24,
SE = $0.10, t = $2.40, p = .020). The remaining three-way interactions were not signifi-
cant (both p’s > .36).
One of our reviewers was concerned that some of the three-way interactions between
condition, response, and inference type might be driven by our specific choice of control
items. For that reason, we analyzed the interaction between response and inference type
for the target condition alone. The results of these analyses should be interpreted with
caution because they fail to take into account possible response biases.
The interaction between response and inference type was significant for scalar infer-
ences and free choice inferences (b = $0.32, SE = 0.09, t = $3.52, p = .002), scalar
inferences and conditional perfection (b = $0.25, SE = 0.10, t = $2.47, p = .015), and
marginally significant for scalar inferences and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (b = $0.15,
SE = 0.08, t = $1.87, p = .069). In addition, it was significant for free choice inferences
Fig. 6. Mean decision times for the four kinds of inferences. Error bars represent standard errors.
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and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (b = 0.23, SE = 0.09, t = 2.49, p = .016) and conditional
perfection and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (b = 0.18, SE = 0.08, t = 2.22, p = .028). The
remaining interaction between free choice inferences and conditional perfection was not
significant (b = 0.09, SE = 0.10, t < 1).
Focusing on the target condition, the difference between “true” and “false” responses
was marginally significant for scalar inferences (b = $0.18, SE = 0.09, t = $2.04,
p = .058) and significant for free choice inferences (b = $0.18, SE = 0.09, t = $1.99,
p = .049). The difference was not significant for conditional perfection and exhaustivity
in “it”-clefts (both t’s < 1). Focusing on the control condition, the difference between
“true” and “false” responses was not significant for scalar inferences (b = 0.16,
SE = 0.09, t = 1.79, p = .123), it was marginally significant for free choice inferences
(b = $0.09, SE = 0.04, t = $2.27, p = .054), and it was significant for the other two
inference types (both p’s < .01).
The results for the target condition were confirmed in a between-participants analysis.
For this analysis, all participants were categorized as literal or pragmatic responder
depending on their preferred response for a particular inference type. For example, some-
one who provided three pragmatic responses and two literal responses for scalar infer-
ences was classified as a pragmatic responder for this inference type, and the results for
her nonpreferred response were discarded from the analysis. A generalized linear model
was constructed predicting logarithmized decision times in target conditions based on
type of responder. The difference between literal and pragmatic responders was signifi-
cant for scalar inferences (b = $0.21, SE = 0.10, t = $2.17, p = .036), but not for any
of the other inference types (all p’s > .28).
As discussed in Section 2.1, Ortony and colleagues found that the interpretation of a
metaphorical expression was only associated with an increase in reading times if it was
not sufficiently contextualized. One of our reviewers speculated that our data might bear
evidence of a similar pattern. Although none of the sentences were properly contextual-
ized, precedent might facilitate the processing of the pragmatic inferences. In order to
evaluate this hypothesis, we repeated the within-participants and between-participants
analyses of the logarithmized decision times in the target condition of each inference
type, this time including the interaction between trial number and response as an indepen-
dent factor. If precedent facilitates the processing of pragmatic inferences, we expect that
decision times for “false” responses decrease with trial number at a faster rate than deci-
sion times for “true” responses, since the former involves pragmatic inferencing.
Table 1
Means and standard errors for the decision times for the four kinds of inferences
Target Control
True False True False
Scalar inference 1,119 (53) 1,407 (107) 1,192 (55) 992 (38)
Free choice inference 1,415 (114) 1,260 (61) 1,156 (48) 1,213 (39)
Conditional perfection 1,815 (155) 1,471 (79) 1,196 (46) 1,500 (64)
Exhaustivity inference 1,225 (82) 1,278 (58) 1,028 (37) 1,230 (44)
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In the within-participants analysis, the interaction between trial number and response
was not significant for any of the four inference types (all p’s > .21). In the between-par-
ticipants analysis, the interaction was marginally significant for conditional perfection
(b = $0.01, SE = 0.00, t = $1.76, p = .08) in the expected direction; that is, the differ-
ence in decision times between “true” and “false” responses became smaller throughout
the experiment. The interaction was not significant for any of the other inference types
(all p’s > .22). Hence, there is little evidence that precedent might have facilitated the
processing of pragmatic inferences.
These findings can be summarized as follows: The computation of scalar inferences
was associated with an increase in decision times. The results for the other three types of
inferences differed significantly from the pattern for scalar inferences in that their compu-
tation facilitated decision times. In addition, there was a significant difference in the pro-
cessing profiles of conditional perfection and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts, with the former
having a greater facilitation effect than the latter.
Before discussing these results, we briefly want to consider a factor that might have had
a confounding effect on the results: the complexity of the verification procedure. It has been
suggested that the reason pragmatic responses take longer than literal responses for scalar
inferences might be that it is more difficult to evaluate the enriched interpretation than the
literal interpretation (Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012; Geurts, 2010). To illustrate, consider
the target picture for scalar inferences in Fig. 1. In order to establish that the literal meaning
is correct, it suffices to inspect the first two circles. Since these are red, it follows that the
sentence is true on its literal interpretation. In order to determine the truth value of the
enriched interpretation, however, it is necessary to inspect each of the five circles. Perhaps,
that is why pragmatic responses took longer than literal responses.
Note that there is a priori evidence against this hypothesis. For conditional perfection
and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts, the enriched meaning of the target sentence was also more
difficult to evaluate than the literal meaning. However, the computation of these two
types of inferences did not lead to an increase in decision times and even facilitated the
decision process. For a more comprehensive evaluation of the complexity hypothesis, we
determined for each condition the minimum number of shapes that had to be evaluated in
order to establish the truth value of the sentence. Visual complexity thus operationalized
was not a significant predictor of decision times (b = $0.01, SE = 0.01, t < 1).
6. General discussion
6.1. Summary
In this study, we investigated the processing of four kinds of inferences that are often
explained as quantity implicatures: scalar inferences, free choice inferences, conditional
perfection, and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts. Replicating Bott and Noveck (2004), we found
that the computation of scalar inferences caused an increase in decision times. Replicating
Chemla and Bott (2014), the computation of free choice inferences was not associated
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with such an increase. Indeed, the within-participants analysis suggested that the compu-
tation of free choice inferences even facilitated the decision process. Conditional perfec-
tion and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts patterned with free choice inferences in this respect.
We discussed two possible explanations for B&N’s finding that the computation of
scalar inferences leads to an increase in response times, given previous findings suggest-
ing that other varieties of conversational implicature, such as indirect questions, sarcasm,
idioms, metaphors, and hyperbole are computed without a processing effort. According to
the counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis, the processing cost for scalar inferences is
induced by having to construct and reason with alternatives the speaker could have
uttered. The lexical-access hypothesis supposes that this processing cost depends on the
structural characteristics of the alternatives. Specifically, a processing cost occurs only if
the construction of alternatives requires substituting constituents in the uttered sentence
with words from the lexicon. The predictions of the two hypotheses and the outcome of
the experiment are summarized in Fig. 7.
The results of this experiment are in line with the lexical-access hypothesis. Condi-
tional perfection and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts require reasoning about what the speaker
could have said. The counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis therefore predicts that both
types of inferences should be associated with a processing cost. This prediction is falsi-
Fig. 7. Interaction effects (target minus control) predicted by the counterfactual-reasoning hypothesis and the
lexical access hypothesis above the interaction effects estimated by the mixed models reported in section 5.8.
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fied by the results of our experiment. By contrast, for neither of these inferences, is it
necessary to construct alternatives by substituting constituents in the uttered sentence with
words from the lexicon. The lexical-access hypothesis thus correctly predicts the absence
of a processing cost for these two inference types.
One intriguing wrinkle in the data is that the size of the difference between “true” and
“false” responses was greater for conditional perfection than for exhaustivity in “it”-
clefts. This suggests that there may be even more subtle differences in processing costs
depending on the type of alternatives. Recall that the computation of exhaustivity in “it”-
clefts proceeds without recourse to alternatives, whereas the derivation of conditional per-
fection involves constructing alternatives by deleting constituents in the uttered sentence.
Perhaps, this difference underlies the different processing profiles of these two inferences.
A problem with this explanation is that there was no difference in the processing profiles
of exhaustivity in “it”-clefts and free choice inferences, which also involve alternative
construction through deletion. One potential explanation is that sentences with embed-
ded occurrences of “or” evoke multiple alternatives corresponding to the individual dis-
juncts without “or,” whereas sentences licensing conditional perfection evoke only one
alternative.
Caution is warranted when evaluating such post hoc explanations, however, since these
were not tested directly in our experiment. Moreover, constructing an experiment that
teases apart these subtle differences will provide a difficult challenge. What is clear, how-
ever, is that there seem to be additional factors at work in determining the processing cost
of a particular inference. See Data S1 in the Supplementary Material for some more dis-
cussion of this point.
It follows from the lexical-access explanation that alternatives are structurally defined
in terms of elementary operations on the uttered sentence, in particular, deletion and
replacement (cf. Fox & Katzir, 2010; Katzir, 2007, pace Rooth, 1992) and that sentence
processing is sensitive to the details of these structural modifications.
The status of free choice inferences and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts as a variety of quan-
tity implicature has been disputed in the literature. Our results provide tentative evidence
that the implicature-based approach is on the right track for both types of inferences. In
both cases, participants were hesitant about whether to judge the target sentence true or
false in a situation in which the inference was false. In this respect, both types of infer-
ences behave just like scalar inferences and conditional perfection, whose status as a vari-
ety of quantity implicature is less controversial. Perhaps more convincingly, participants
who responded pragmatically to scalar inferences and conditional perfection also tended
to respond pragmatically to free choice inferences and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts. This
suggests that responses were driven by the same mechanism for each of the four infer-
ence types.
Of course, these observations should not be construed as incontrovertible evidence for
the implicature-based approach. First, it may be the case that further theoretical work pro-
vides a more compelling and inclusive explanation of free choice inferences and exhaus-
tivity in “it”-clefts. Second, it is altogether unclear what the precise processing
predictions for alternative approaches are. Third, the aforementioned correlations could
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be driven by response biases. Defusing this counterargument would involve testing items
with different kinds of ambiguities and see if responses to these items correlate with
those for the target items, as predicted if the results are driven by response biases. Taken
together, these considerations limit the scope of our conclusion to claiming that the data
we gathered for free choice inferences and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts are in line with what
would be predicted on an implicature-based approach.
6.2. Grice’s approach and Marr’s levels of analysis
The results of our experiment provide further evidence against construing Grice’s
approach as an account of utterance processing. According to Grice, conversational impli-
catures are calculated using an argument based on the literal interpretation of an utterance
and the assumption that the speaker is cooperative. Mapping this definition to utterance
processing would entail that the literal interpretation of an utterance precedes the enriched
interpretation. This prediction is falsified by the processing data for free choice infer-
ences, conditional perfection, and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts. For each of these inferences,
the enriched interpretation was accessed at least as quickly as the literal interpretation.
As discussed before, however, it would be an exegetical and conceptual mistake to
interpret Grice’s approach as an account of utterance processing. Grice’s approach is situ-
ated at the computational level, explaining what inferences listeners are licensed to draw
and why. It should not be confused for an algorithmic account of how these inferences
are computed. Our results indicate that such an algorithmic account should allow for par-
allel processing of enriched meanings (e.g., Chierchia, 2004; Geurts, 2010; Levinson,
2000; R!ecanati, 1995).
There is thus a substantial difference between the serial computation procedure postu-
lated at the computational level and the parallel processing that occurs at the algorithmic
level. How problematic is this difference for Grice’s approach?
One method of bridging the gap between Grice’s approach and the processing data is
to assume that conversational implicatures can become conventionalized (Horn & Bayer,
1984; Levinson, 2000; Morgan, 1978; Searle, 1975). This assumption entails that certain
conversational implicatures are read off directly from the form of the uttered sentences
instead of being actively computed, in a similar sense as the meaning of a written string
may be read off directly from its form rather than being determined by converting letters
to phonemes (e.g., Coltheart, 2003). For example, upon encountering a sentence of the
form “P if Q,” the hearer can immediately infer that the speaker does not believe P to be
necessarily true.
For this account to work, it remains to be explained why the computation of scalar
inferences is still associated with a processing cost. Two such explanations suggest them-
selves. First, it may be the case that sentences of the form “Some A are B” evoke an
underspecified inference “Not Q A are B” which needs to be parametrized by inserting a
suitable replacement for “Q.” This explanation reflects the observation that a sentence
with “some” can license different inferences depending on the context. For example,
“Some A are B” may imply that not all A are B, that not most A are B, that not many A
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are B, or even that it is not just one, two, or three A that are B (Degen & Tanenhaus,
2011; Franke, 2014; van Tiel, 2014a; van Tiel & Geurts, 2014). This proposal comple-
ments the lexical-access hypothesis: Scalar inferences are associated with a processing
cost because their computation involves parametrization by drawing upon the lexicon. If
so, it is predicted that the processing cost disappears in situations in which it is clear
what the relevant parameters are.
An alternative explanation is based on the hypothesis that the processing cost of a con-
ventionalized conversational implicature depends on the frequency of the enriched inter-
pretation in natural conversations. The observation that the proportion of literal and
pragmatic responses varied across inference types provides some support for the role of
statistical regularities. Why were participants more likely to compute conditional perfec-
tion than scalar inferences, and scalar inferences than free choice inferences? Prima facie
it seems difficult to find a structural basis for this difference, and it seems probable that
various cues conspire in influencing rates of pragmatic inferencing, including statistical
regularities (cf. Seidenberg, 1997).
According to this proposal, scalar inferences are associated with a processing cost
because they are in general less frequent than the other three types of inferences. This
explanation receives some support from work by Degen (2015), who extracted sentences
with “some” from a corpus of natural language and asked participants to indicate how
likely it is that they would derive the scalar inference. Her results suggest that scalar
inferences are relatively infrequent in natural language. However, further work is needed
to decide between these proposals and spell out the role of statistical regularities in prag-
matic inferencing.
6.3. The origin of implicit meaning
What is the function of conversational implicature in linguistic communication? Why
use the underspecified “some” rather than its unambiguous alternatives “at least some”
and “some but not all”? It seems plausible that the speaker desires to keep her utterances
as short as possible, especially if the distinction between the literal and the enriched inter-
pretation is not particularly relevant for the purpose of the conversation. However, if the
use of an underinfomative sentence results in a protracted reasoning process on the side
of the hearer (B&N observed a difference of about 600 ms between literal and pragmatic
responses for scalar inferences), the distribution of effort seems to inordinately favor the
speaker.
Our results suggest that conversational implicatures based on violations of the quantity
maxim are not always associated with a processing cost on the part of the hearer. The
presence of conversational implicature is thus advantageous to the speaker without trou-
bling the hearer, assuming that both are coordinated about the goal and direction of the
conversation. If the latter condition is not met, the hearer’s beliefs about the extent to
which the speaker is cooperative and what she considers relevant can be mistaken, thus
making room for notions like face (Pinker et al., 2008) and manipulation (Reboul, 2007).
However, it is not necessary to evoke these notions to explain the emergence of conversa-
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tional implicature. It is possible that the notions of face and manipulation coopted conver-
sational implicature once it came into place through constraints of least effort.
6.4. Future research
A central assumption in this and much previous work on scalar inferences is that find-
ings for “some” can be generalized to the entire family of scalar expressions. Indeed, the
lexical access hypothesis predicts that there should be no processing difference between
the inference from “some” to the negation of “all” and the inference from “warm” to the
negation of “hot,” since the derivation of both inferences involves substituting con-
stituents with material from the lexicon.
However, recent work has shown that the assumption that all scalar expressions are
alike is not always warranted (van Tiel, van Miltenburg, Zevakhina, & Geurts, 2014).
The likelihood of scalar inferences varies dramatically for different scalar expressions,
ranging from close to 0% to 100% with “some” occurring at the top of that scale. It thus
seems at least conceivable that different scalar expressions might be associated with dif-
ferent processing profiles. Such processing differences might be related to differences in
the number and availability of potential alternatives. For example, the space of possible
alternatives for “That movie is good” is much larger than for “The battery is low” (see
van Tiel et al., 2014: experiment 3). Hence, one might expect the inference from “good”
to “not excellent” to be more time consuming than the inference from “low” to “not
depleted.” Extending the scope of inquiry to other scalar expressions thus seems a
straightforward way of testing the robustness and generality of our results and
conclusions.
If the results are corroborated, it will be interesting to see if children are less prone to
derive scalar inferences for the same reason as adults who derive scalar inferences exhibit
an increase in response times. To this end, the scope of inquiry in the developmental lit-
erature should be extended to other varieties of quantity implicature, such as free choice
inferences (Tieu et al., 2015), conditional perfection, and exhaustivity in “it”-clefts (Heiz-
mann, 2007). Given children’s sensitivity to the particularities of the experimental task
(Chierchia et al., 2001; Feeney et al., 2004; Guasti et al., 2005; Katsos & Bishop, 2010;
Papafragou & Musolino, 2003), it will be important to test these inferences in an inte-
grated experimental design.
Lastly, the lexical-access hypothesis predicts that it should be possible to eliminate the
processing cost associated with the derivation of scalar inferences by priming the alterna-
tive expression, thus easing its retrieval and hence the construction of the required alter-
native. Moreover, assuming that children are less prone to derive scalar inferences
because of their problems with retrieving alternatives from the lexicon, the same method
should make their behavior more adultlike. Indeed, both predictions have been borne out
in a number of experiments (Chierchia et al., 2001; Grodner et al., 2010; Papafragou &
Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004).
Regardless of the results of these investigations, the conclusion remains that many con-
versational implicatures are not associated with a processing cost. Only when their
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derivation involves competition with an alternative whose construction requires consulting
the lexicon does an increase in reaction times occur. This finding warns us against using
presence of a processing cost as a diagnostic for conversational implicatures. More
broadly, our findings indicate that sometimes pragmatic inferencing is not associated with
a processing cost.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by F.R.S.-FNRS Research Incentive Grant F.4502.15 (prin-
cipal investigator: Mikhail Kissine), the Bundesministerium fu¨r Bildung und Forschung
(BMBF) Grant Nr. 01UG1411., and by the Research Council of the University of Leuven,
project OT/11/030, which are gratefully acknowledged. We thank Corien Bary, Lewis Bott,
Emmanuel Chemla, Chris Cummins, Michael Franke, Bart Geurts, Helen de Hoop, Paula
Rubio-Fern!andez, and Sammie Tarenskeen for their comments on an earlier version of this
paper, and the audiences of the Semantics and Pragmatics workshop at ZAS Berlin and the
2015 Experimental Pragmatics conference in Chicago for their valuable feedback. In addi-
tion, we thank the editor and reviewers of Cognitive Science. Their comments have made a
tremendous impact on this paper and on our thoughts on the topic.
Notes
1. Mechanical Turk is a website where workers perform so-called human intelligence
tasks (HITs) for financial compensation. It has been shown that the quality of data
gathered through Mechanical Turk equals that of laboratory data (e.g., Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Schnoebelen & Kuperman, 2010; Sprouse, 2011).
2. The full experiment can be accessed online via http://spellout.net/ibexexps/bob-
vantiel/quantity-english1/experiment.html.
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